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AMBIGUITY AND THE VALUE OF HEDGING
This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive
firm under price uncertainty when the firm’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aver-
sion and an unbiased forward hedging opportunity is available. Ambiguity is modeled
by a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about
which of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled
by the (second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first-order) ex-
pected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the price
risk. Within this framework, the separation and full-hedging theorems remain intact.
Banning the firm from trading its output forward at the unbiased forward price has
adverse effect on the firm’s production decision. The firm finds the unbiased forward
hedging opportunity more valuable in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity.
Furthermore, the value of hedging increases when the firm’s beliefs are more ambiguous,
or when the firm becomes more ambiguity averse.
INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work of Holthausen (1979), there has been a large body of research on
the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under price uncertainty a`
la Sandmo (1971). Two notable results emanate from this literature (Broll, 1992; Broll
and Wong, 1999; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Danthine, 1978; Feder et al., 1980; Wong, 2004,
2012, 2013). First, the separation theorem states that the firm’s optimal output level
depends neither on the risk attitude of the firm, nor on the incidence of the underlying
price uncertainty should the firm be able to trade its output forward. Second, the full-
hedging theorem states that the firm should fully hedge against its exposure to the price
risk provided that the forward price is unbiased.1
Most of the extant models in the literature assume that the firm’s preferences admit
the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. Such a modeling
1The full-hedging theorem is analogous to a well-known result in the insurance literature that a risk-averse
individual fully insures at an actuarially fair price (Mossin, 1968).
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approach rules out the possibility that the firm is unable to unambiguously assign a prob-
ability distribution that uniquely describes the price risk, which gives rise to ambiguity, or
uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921). Beginning with Ellsberg (1961), it has been well
documented that ambiguity could lead to the violation of the independence axiom, which is
responsible for the decision criterion being linear in the outcome probabilities. Individuals
seem to prefer gambles with known rather than unknown probabilities, suggesting that they
might be ambiguity averse. Indeed, ambiguity aversion has been confirmed in a variety of
experimental settings (Chow and Sarin, 2001; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and We-
ber, 1993), and in surveys of business owners and managers (Chesson and Viscusi, 2003;
Viscusi and Chesson, 1999).
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate ambiguity into the model of the competitive
firm under price uncertainty. Klibanoff et al. (2005) have recently developed a powerful
decision criterion known as “smooth ambiguity aversion” that is compatible with ambiguity
averse preferences under uncertainty (hereafter referred to as the KMM model). The KMM
model features the recursive structure that is far more tractable in comparison to other
models of ambiguity such as the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-prior)
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).2 Specifically, the KMMmodel represents ambiguity
by a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which
of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. The KMM model then measures the firm’s
expected utility under ambiguity by taking the (second-order) expectation of a concave
transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible
subjective distribution of the price risk.3 This recursive structure creates a crisp separation
between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, i.e., between beliefs and tastes, thereby making
the conventional techniques used in the decision theory under uncertainty applicable in the
context of ambiguity (Alary et al., 2013; Gollier, 2011; Snow, 2010, 2011; Taboga, 2005;
2See Lien (2000) and Lien and Wang (2003) who adopt the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) to examine the competitive firm’s production and hedging decisions.
3Skiadas (2013) shows that smooth ambiguity preferences can be approximated by preferences admitting
an expected utility representation in continuous-time or high-frequency models under Brownian or Poisson
uncertainty.
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Treich, 2010).
Within the context of the KMM model, the separation and full-hedging theorems are
shown to be robust to the incorporation of ambiguity and ambiguity preferences. Banning
the ambiguity-averse firm from trading its output forward at the unbiased forward price has
the usual adverse effect on the firm’s production decision. The unbiased forward hedging
opportunity is shown to have higher value in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity,
with more ambiguous beliefs, and with greater ambiguity aversion. The value of hedging
as such increases when ambiguity and ambiguity preferences prevail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the KMM
model of the competitive firm under price uncertainty when the firm can trade its output
forward at the unbiased forward price. The subsequent section characterizes the production
and hedging decisions of the ambiguity-averse firm. The penultimate section examines how
the value of hedging is affected by the presence of ambiguity, by more ambiguous beliefs,
and by greater ambiguity aversion. The final section concludes.
THE MODEL
Consider the competitive firm of Sandmo (1971) within the context of the KMM model.
There is one period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single commodity
according to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q)
is compounded to date 1. The firm’s production technology exhibits decreasing returns to
scale so that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0 and C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.
At date 1, the firm sells its entire output, Q, at the then prevailing per-unit price, P˜ ,
which is not known ex ante.4 The price risk, P˜ , is distributed according to an objective
cumulative distribution function, H(P ), over support [P, P ], where 0 < P < P . The
firm, however, is uncertain about H(P ) and thus faces ambiguity. Let F (P |θ) be the
4Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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firm’s subjective cumulative distribution function of P˜ over support [P, P ], where θ is the
realization of an unknown parameter, θ˜. The KMMmodel represents ambiguity by a second-
order subjective cumulative distribution function of θ˜, G(θ), over support [θ, θ] with θ < θ,
which captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective cumulative distribution
function, F (P |θ), governs the price risk, P˜ . As in Snow (2010, 2011), the firm’s ambiguous
beliefs are assumed to be unbiased in the sense that the expected price risk is equal to the
objective price risk:
∫ θ
θ
F (P |θ)dG(θ) = H(P ), (1)
for all P ∈ [P, P ].5
To hedge against the price risk, P˜ , the firm can trade the commodity forward at the
unbiased per-unit forward price, P f , determined at date 0:
P f =
∫ P
P
PdH(P ) =
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
PdF (P |θ)dG(θ), (2)
where the second equality follows from Equation (1). Let X be the number of units of the
commodity sold (purchased if negative) forward by the firm at date 0. The firm’s profit
at date 1 is, therefore, given by Π˜ = P˜Q + (P f − P˜ )X − C(Q). The firm possesses a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(Π), defined over its profit at date 1, Π, with
U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion.
The recursive structure of the KMM model implies that the firm’s expected utility
under ambiguity can be computed in three steps. First, the firm’s expected utility for
each subjective cumulative distribution function of P˜ is calculated. Second, each (first-
order) expected utility obtained in the first step is transformed by an increasing function,
ϕ(u), where u is the firm’s utility level. Finally, the (second-order) expectation of the
transformed expected utility obtained in the second step is taken with respect to the second-
5The assumption that the expected price risk is equal to the objective price risk is motivated by the
premise that the behavior of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker should be unaffected by the introduction
of, or changes in, ambiguity.
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order subjective cumulative distribution function of θ˜. The firm’s ex-ante decision problem
as such can be stated as
max
Q≥0,X
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ+ (P f − P )X −C(Q)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ). (3)
Inspection of the objective function of program (3) reveals that the effect of ambiguity,
represented by the cumulative distribution functions, F (P |θ) and G(θ), and the effect of
ambiguity preferences, represented by the shape of the ambiguity function, ϕ(u), can be
separated and thus studied independently.
The firm is said to be ambiguity averse if, for any given pair of output level and forward
position, (Q,X), the objective function of program (3) decreases when the firm’s ambiguous
beliefs, specified by G(θ), change in a way that induces a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of the firm’s first-order expected utility. According to this definition, Klibanoff
et al. (2005) show that ambiguity aversion implies concavity for ϕ(u), and that a concave
transformation of ϕ(u) results in greater ambiguity aversion.6 Throughout the paper, ϕ(u)
is assumed to satisfy that ϕ′(u) > 0 and ϕ′′(u) < 0 so that the firm is ambiguity averse.
The first-order conditions for program (3) are given by
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′
{∫ P
P
U [PQ∗ + (P f − P )X∗ − C(Q∗)]dF (P |θ)
}
×U ′[PQ∗ + (P f − P )X∗ −C(Q∗)][P −C′(Q∗)]dF (P |θ)dG(θ) = 0, (4)
and
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′
{∫ P
P
U [PQ∗ + (P f − P )X∗ − C(Q∗)]dF (P |θ)
}
×U ′[PQ∗ + (P f − P )X∗ −C(Q∗)](P f − P )dF (P |θ)dG(θ) = 0, (5)
6When ϕ(u) = [1− exp(−αu)]/α, Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the maxmin expected utility model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is the limiting case as the constant absolute ambiguity aversion, α, approaches
infinity under some conditions.
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where Q∗ and X∗ are the firm’s optimal output level and forward position, respectively. The
second-order conditions for program (3) are satisfied given that U ′′(Π) < 0, C′′(Q) > 0, and
ϕ′′(u) < 0.
THE EFFECT OF HEDGING
To solve Equations (4) and (5) simultaneously, suppose that the firm adopts a full-hedge,
i.e., X∗ = Q∗. Then, Equation (5) becomes
ϕ′{U [P fQ∗ − C(Q∗)]}U ′[P fQ∗ − C(Q∗)]
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
(P f − P )dF (P |θ)dG(θ) = 0, (6)
which holds given Equation (2). Hence, Equation (6) implies that X∗ = Q∗ is indeed a
solution to program (3). Substituting X∗ = Q∗ into Equation (4) yields
ϕ′{U [P fQ∗ − C(Q∗)]}U ′[P fQ∗ − C(Q∗)][P f −C′(Q∗)] = 0, (7)
which follows from Equation (2). Hence, Equation (7) implies that Q∗ solves C′(Q∗) = P f .
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. If the ambiguity-averse competitive firm can trade the commodity forward
at the unbiased per-unit forward price, P f , the firm’s optimal output level, Q∗ solves
C′(Q∗) = P f , and its optimal forward position is a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = Q∗.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Since the firm can always sell the last unit
of its output forward at the forward price, P f , the usual optimality condition applies in that
the marginal cost of production, C′(Q∗), must be equated to the known marginal revenue,
P f , which determines the optimal output level, Q∗. Since P f is unbiased, the firm, being
risk averse, indeed finds it optimal to adopt a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = Q∗, that completely
eliminates the price risk, P˜ . Proposition 1 as such extends the celebrated separation and
full-hedging theorems to the case of smooth ambiguity preferences.
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Since the separation theorem holds, the firm’s output level is fixed at Q∗. In this
case, the firm’s hedging problem is akin to a standard portfolio choice problem wherein
the investment in the risky asset is equal to the unhedged position, Q∗ − X , while the
investment in the riskless asset is equal to the forward position, X . Gollier (2011) examines
the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion on portfolio choices and asset prices. He shows
that the demand for the risky asset under ambiguity aversion is positive, zero, or negative,
depending on whether the equity premium is positive, zero, or negative, respectively. In
the hedging context, the equity premium is simply equal to the expected output price net
of the forward price. It follows immediately from the results of Gollier (2011) that the
firm optimally opts for an under-hedge (Q∗ −X∗ > 0), a full-hedge (Q∗ −X∗ = 0), or an
over-hedger (Q∗ −X∗ < 0), if the expected output price is greater than, equal to, or less
than the forward price, respectively, which are consistent with the results of Proposition 1.
Indeed, the comparative static results of Gollier (2011) are directly applicable to the firm’s
optimal forward position when the forward price is biased, as is shown in Iwaki and Osaki
(2012).
To examine the effect of hedging on production, suppose that the firm is banned from
trading the commodity forward so that X ≡ 0. In this case, the firm’s optimal output level,
Q◦, solves the following first-order condition:
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ − C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
×U ′[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)][P −C′(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)dG(θ) = 0. (8)
The following proposition shows that Q◦ < Q∗.
Proposition 2. Banning the ambiguity-averse competitive firm from trading the commodity
forward at the unbiased per-unit forward price, P f , results in a reduction in the optimal
output level, i.e., Q◦ < Q∗.
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Proof. Partially differentiating the objective function of program (3) with respect to Q,
and evaluating the resulting derivative to zero, yields the optimal output level, Q(X), for a
given forward position, X :
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′
{∫ P
P
U{PQ(X) + (P f − P )X − C[Q(X)]}dF (P |θ)
}
×U ′{PQ(X) + (P f − P )X −C[Q(X)]}{P −C′[Q(X)]}dF (P |θ)dG(θ) = 0. (9)
Equations (4) and (9) imply that Q∗ = Q(X∗), and Equations (8) and (9) imply that
Q◦ = Q(0). Using Equation (9) to totally differentiate the objective function of program
(3) with respect to X , and evaluating the resulting derivative at X = 0 so that Q(0) = Q◦,
yields
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ − C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
×U ′[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)](P f − P )dF (P |θ)dG(θ) > 0, (10)
where the inequality follows from the fact that X∗ = Q∗ > 0, Equation (5), and the second-
order conditions for program (3). Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (10) yields
C′(Q◦) < P f . It then follows from C′′(Q) > 0 that Q◦ < Q∗. 2
To see the intuition for Proposition 2, recast Equation (8) as7
C′(Q◦) = P f +
Cov
{
ϕ′
{∫ P
P U [PQ
◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ˜)
}
U ′[P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)], P˜
}
E
{
ϕ′
{∫ P
P U [PQ
◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ˜)
}
U ′[P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]
} , (11)
where P f is given by Equation (2), and E(·) and Cov(·, ·) are the expectation and covariance
operators with respect to the joint cumulative distribution function of θ˜ and P˜ . Equation
(11) states that the firm’s optimal output level, Q◦, is the one that equates the marginal
cost of production, C′(Q◦), to the certainty equivalent output price that takes the firm’s
7For any two random variables, X˜ and Y˜ , it is true that Cov(X˜, Y˜ ) = E(X˜Y˜ ) − E(X˜)E(Y˜ ).
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smooth ambiguity preferences into account. Indeed, the second term on the right-hand side
of Equation (11) captures the price risk premium, which must be negative since the firm
optimally sells its output forward, i.e., X∗ > 0, at the unbiased forward price, P f , thereby
rendering C′(Q◦) < P f . It then follows from the strict convexity of the cost function that
Q◦ < Q∗.
THE VALUE OF HEDGING
If the firm can trade the commodity forward at the unbiased per-unit forward price, P f ,
Proposition 1 shows that the firm optimally opts for a full-hedge and thus its profit at date
1 is certain at P fQ∗ − C(Q∗). Since X∗ > 0, the firm must attain a higher value of its
objective function of program (3) than in the case that trading the commodity forward at
the unbiased forward price, P f , is prohibited:
ϕ{U [P fQ∗ −C(Q∗)]} >
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ − C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ). (12)
Let W ◦ be the solution to
ϕ{U [P fQ∗ −C(Q∗)−W ◦]} =
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ). (13)
Equations (12) and (13) imply that W ◦ > 0, which captures the firm’s willingness to pay
to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity.
When the firm faces no ambiguity, i.e., F (P |θ) = H(P ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] and P ∈
[P, P ], Proposition 1 remains intact so that the firm’s profit at date 1 is certain at P fQ∗−
C(Q∗). Let Q† be the firm’s optimal output level in the absence of ambiguity and forward
hedging opportunity. The firm’s willingness to pay to possess the unbiased forward hedging
opportunity in this case, W † > 0, is the solution to
ϕ{U [P fQ∗ −C(Q∗)−W †]} = ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ† − C(Q†)]dH(P )
}
. (14)
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Comparing W ◦ and W † yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The presence of ambiguity raises the ambiguity-averse competitive firm’s
willingness to pay to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity, i.e., W ◦ >W †.
Proof. Since ϕ′′(u) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ)
< ϕ
{∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)dG(θ)
}
= ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ − C(Q◦)]dH(P )
}
, (15)
where the equality follows from Equation (1). Since Q† is the optimal output level in the
absence of ambiguity and unbiased forward hedging opportunity, it must be true that
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ† − C(Q†)]dH(P )
}
> ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ − C(Q◦)]dH(P )
}
. (16)
Hence, Equations (15) and (16) imply that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ) < ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ† − C(Q†)]dH(P )
}
. (17)
It then follows from Equations (13), (14), and (17) that W ◦ > W †. 2
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. The presence of the unbiased forward
hedging opportunity allows the firm to lock in the price risk, P˜ , at the forward price, P f ,
thereby completely eliminating the price risk. Ambiguity as such is also eliminated, which
creates additional benefit to the ambiguity-averse firm that faces ambiguity. Hence, the firm
finds it more valuable to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity in the presence
than in the absence of ambiguity, rendering that W ◦ > W †.
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According to Jewitt and Mukerji (2014), the firm’s beliefs are said to be more ambiguous
if the firm is made worse off (indifferent) as a result of the change in beliefs when the firm is
ambiguity averse (neutral). This definition of greater ambiguity is akin to the Rothschild-
Stiglitz (1970) notion of mean-preserving-spread increases in risk. Let Fˆ (P |θ) and Gˆ(θ)
be the cumulative distribution functions when the firm’s beliefs are more ambiguous in the
sense of Jewitt and Mukerji (2014). Let Qˆ◦ be the firm’s optimal output level with more
ambiguous beliefs and with no hedging. In this case, the firm’s willingness to pay to possess
the unbiased forward hedging opportunity, Wˆ ◦ > 0, is the solution to
ϕ{U [P fQ∗ −C(Q∗)− Wˆ ◦]} =
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQˆ◦ −C(Qˆ◦)]dFˆ (P |θ)
}
dGˆ(θ), (18)
since Proposition 1 remains intact. ComparingW ◦ and Wˆ ◦ yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Greater ambiguity raises the ambiguity-averse competitive firm’s willingness
to pay to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity, i.e., Wˆ ◦ > W ◦.
Proof. Note that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ)
>
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQˆ◦ −C(Qˆ◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ)
>
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQˆ◦ −C(Qˆ◦)]dFˆ (P |θ)
}
dGˆ(θ), (19)
where the first inequality follows from the fact thatQ◦ is the firm’s optimal output level with
the initial ambiguous beliefs and with no hedging, and the second inequality follows from
the fact that Fˆ (P |θ) and Gˆ(θ) are the cumulative distribution functions when the firm’s
beliefs are more ambiguous in the sense of Jewitt and Mukerji (2014). Hence, Equations
(13), (18), and (19) imply that Wˆ ◦ > W ◦. 2
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Propositions 3 and 4 show that the global effect and the marginal effect of ambiguity
on the firm’s willingness to pay to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity are
consistent with each other.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the firm becomes more ambiguity averse when ϕ(u)
is replaced by K[ϕ(u)] in the objective function of program (3), where K(·) satisfies that
K ′(·) > 0 and K ′′(·) < 0. Let Q be the optimal output level when the firm’s smooth
ambiguity preferences are represented by K[ϕ(u)] and the firm is banned from trading the
commodity forward at the unbiased forward price, P f . In this case, the willingness to pay
by this more ambiguity-averse firm to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity,
W  > 0, is the solution to
K
{
ϕ{U [P fQ∗ −C(Q∗)−W ]}
}
=
∫ θ
θ
K
{
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ −C(Q)]dF (P |θ)
}}
dG(θ), (20)
since Proposition 1 remains intact. ComparingW ◦ andW  yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Greater ambiguity aversion raises the ambiguity-averse competitive firm’s
willingness to pay to possess the unbiased forward hedging opportunity, i.e., W  >W ◦.
Proof. Since K ′′(·) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
∫ θ
θ
K
{
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ −C(Q)]dF (P |θ)
}}
dG(θ)
< K
{∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ −C(Q)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ)
}
. (21)
Since Q◦ is the optimal output level of the less ambiguity-averse firm in the absence of
forward hedging opportunity, it must be true that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ)
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>
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ −C(Q)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ). (22)
Hence, Equations (21) and (22) imply that
∫ θ
θ
K
{
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ −C(Q)]dF (P |θ)
}}
dG(θ)
< K
{∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]dF (P |θ)
}
dG(θ)
}
. (23)
It then follows from Equations (13), (20), and (23) that W  > W ◦. 2
The intuition for Proposition 5 is as follows. When the firm is more ambiguity averse, the
incentive to remove ambiguity becomes stronger. The firm’s willingness to pay to possess
the unbiased forward hedging opportunity as such increases in a systematic manner with
greater ambiguity aversion.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under
price uncertainty a` la Sandmo (1971) when the firm’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity
aversion developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005), and an unbiased forward hedging opportunity
is available. According to Klibanoff et al. (2005), ambiguity is modeled by a second-order
probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective
beliefs govern the price risk. On the other hand, ambiguity preferences are modeled by the
(second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first-order) expected utility
of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the price risk. Within
this framework, the separation and full-hedging theorems are shown to be robust to the
incorporation of ambiguity and ambiguity preferences. Furthermore, the ambiguity-averse
firm is shown to produce more with than without the unbiased forward hedging opportunity.
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The firm also values the unbiased forward hedging opportunity more in the presence than in
the absence of ambiguity, with more ambiguous beliefs, and with greater ambiguity aversion.
The value of hedging as such increases when ambiguity and ambiguity preferences prevail.
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